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September 14, 2006 
 
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement before the subcommittee today. 
These comments reflect my personal views, rather than those of Georgetown University 
or other institutions with which I am affiliated. 
 
Patent Term Extension Within the Hatch-Waxman Act 
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act represents an effort to refine, within the pharmaceutical 
industry, the central problem of any intellectual property regime: Encouraging the labors 
that lead to innovation, on one hand, and disseminating the fruits of those labors, on the 
other. Thus, the Hatch- Waxman Act codified an expedited generic marketing approval 
protocol, but also provided for term extension for patents on approved drugs.1 Patent 
term extension is unquestionably a fundamental part of a statute that, for all of its 
perceived flaws, has been highly successful in both encouraging the generic drug industry 
and promoting the discovery and development of new drugs by brandname firms.  
 
Codified at 35 U.S.C. 156, the patent term extension provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
stands among the most unwieldy statutes in the federal code. One portion of that statute is 
relatively clear, however. An application for term extension "may only be submitted 
within the sixty-day period beginning on the date the product received permission under 
the provision of law under which the applicable regulatory review period occurred for 
commercial marketing or use." As this Committee considers modifications to this period, 
a few basic substantive points may be worthy of review. First, the Federal Circuit has 
interpreted the 60-day deadline strictly. Second, provided that an application is filed 
within the statutory period, existing USPTO rules already accord applicants for term 
extension some relief in complying with regulatory requirements. Third, term extension 
determinations do not entail merely a ministerial calculation. The filing of an application 
for patent term extension potentially triggers a fairly elaborate proceeding involving the 
USPTO, FDA, and patent proprietor and possibly third parties as well. Fourth, generic 
firms reach decisions about pursuing their own applications, along with patent 
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challenges, in a relatively tight time frame that is governed by FDA-administered 
marketing exclusivities. Because the duration of proprietary rights is obviously 
significant concern for these stakeholders, determining entitlement to patent term 
extension in a seasonable manner serves important regulatory goals. Finally, both the 
Patent Act in general, and the Hatch-Waxman Act in particular, provide that failure to 
meet certain deadlines is irremediable. These comments discuss each of these points in 
further detail below. 
 
Judicial Precedent. Longstanding judicial precedent has interpreted the 60-day statutory 
time period strictly. Notably, in its 1989 decision in Unimed, Inc. v. Quigg, the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered an application for term extension of U.S. 
Patent No. 3,668,224. The '224 patent described and claimed a process for making 
dibenzo-pyran. That compound, known under the trademark MARINOL, is the synthetic 
equivalent of an isomer of delta-9- tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal 
psychoactive substance in Cannabis sativa L. marijuana. The exclusive licensee of the 
'224 patent, Unimed, submitted an NDA to the FDA on June 24, 1981, pursuant to the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.4 The FDA approved the NDA on May 31, 1985, 
but reminded Unimed that "MARINOL may not be legally marketed until the Drug 
Enforcement Administration has completed rescheduling activities as required by the 
Controlled Substances Act."5 This latter step took place on May 13, 1986, when the Drug 
Enforcement Administration ("DEA") finalized the removal of MARINOL from 
Schedule I to Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act.6 Unimed filed its application 
for extension of the '224 patent term under 35 U.S.C. 156 at the USPTO 14 days later. By 
that point, more than one year had elapsed since the FDA had issued marketing approval 
for MARINOL. 
 
The USPTO denied Unimed's application, concluding that it had not been filed within 
sixty days of receipt of FDA marketing approval. Although the District Court for the 
District of Columbia reversed the USPTO's decision,8 on appeal the Federal Circuit again 
reversed. Judge Mayer stated the issue crisply: "The timeliness issue boils down to 
whether the 60-day period specified in section 156(d)(1) began, as the [USPTO] 
 4 
Commissioner argues, when the FDA sent its approval letter, on May 31, 1985, or, as 
Unimed argues, when the DEA rescheduled Marinol nearly a year later." Siding with the 
USPTO, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the sixty-day period identified in 35 U.S.C. 
156(d)(1) commenced "on the date the product received permission under the provision 
of law under which the applicable regulatory review period occurred for commercial 
marketing or use." 35 U.S.C. 156(g)(1)(B) in turn defined the "applicable regulatory 
review period" as section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which 
governs the approval of new drugs by the FDA, and nowhere mentioned the role of the 
DEA. The Federal Circuit therefore agreed with the USPTO that the 60-day period began 
upon the FDA approval date. As a result, the '224 patent term extension application was 
considered to have been untimely filed and was therefore rejected.10 It should be 
appreciated that both the patent laws and food and drug laws have been amended 
numerous times during the 17-year period since the Federal Circuit decided Unimed v. 
Quigg. Further, this subcommittee has spent significant time in recent years contemplated 
further reforms to the patent laws. To my knowledge, this is the first occasion where the 
Congress has considered altering 35 U.S.C. 156. 
 
USPTO Regulations. Agency regulations allow New Drug Application (NDA) holders to 
assemble somewhat truncated applications for term extension, with the remainder of the 
material to follow. Rulemaking therefore already affords brand-name drug companies the 
ability to submit a somewhat condensed application that is more readily prepared during 
the 60-day statutory period. In particular, the USPTO has employed its rule-making 
authority11 to provide that each application for term extension under 35 U.S.C. 156 
include some fifteen elements.12 The USPTO will assign a filing date to an application 
for term extension that falls somewhat short of its regulatory standards, however. If the 
application (1) identifies the approved product; (2) identifies each federal statute under 
which regulatory review occurred; (3) identifies the patent for which an extension is 
being sought; (4) identifies each claim of the patent which claims the approved product or 
a method of using or manufacturing the approved product; (5) provides sufficient 
information to enable the USPTO to determine whether the patent is eligible for 
extension, and the rights that will be derived from the extension, and information to 
 5 
enable the Director and the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Secretary of 
Agriculture to determine the length of the regulatory review period; and (6) includes a 
brief description of the activities undertaken by the marketing applicant during the 
applicable regulatory review period with respect to the approved product and the 
significant dates applicable to such activities, then the USPTO will accord the application 
a filing date.13 This USPTO policy is based on the obligatory nature of these six 
elements in a term extension application under 35 U.S.C. 156(d)(1)(A)-(D), while the 
remainder of the USPTO requirements were established via regulation. 
 
If the USPTO determines that the term extension application should be accorded a filing 
date, but that it does not fully comply with its regulations, the applicant ordinarily has 
two months to complete the application.14 The applicant may extend this period through 
the payment of additional surcharges in accordance with usual USPTO practice. 
 
The USPTO therefore already provides NDA holders with some flexibility in assembling 
their term extension applications, provided of course that the 60-day deadline is met. 
Subsequent Proceedings. The submission of a complete application for term extension 
under 35 U.S.C. 156 commences a fairly elaborate proceeding involving the USPTO, 
FDA, and patent proprietor and possibly third parties as well. In short, within 60 days of 
receiving the application, the USPTO will request either the Secretary of Agriculture (if 
the product is subject to the Virus- Serum-Toxin Act) or the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (in all other cases) to calculate the applicable "regulatory review 
period," which is then published in the Federal Register. 
 
The date of publication is followed by a 180-day period during which any interested party 
may file a petition contending that the applicant has not acted with due diligence.16 The 
appropriate secretary must determine within 90 days of filing whether the applicant has 
acted with due diligence or not, and then publish this determination in the Federal 
Register. An interested person may then request an informal hearing on this 
determination within 60 days of publication, which is held within 60 days of the request. 
Following the hearing, the appropriate Secretary is allotted 30 days to affirm or modify 
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its original decision and then notify the USPTO Director. The USPTO then forwards a 
Notice of Final Determination to the applicant. The applicant may make a single request 
for reconsideration of the determination within one month, or such other time period set 
forth in the determination. If no such request for reconsideration is filed, or upon the 
completion of its review of such a request, the USPTO will then issue a Certificate of 
Extension of Patent Term to the applicant. 
 
In view of these statutory procedures, it should be appreciated that the filing of an 
application under 35 U.S.C. 156 does not merely trigger the ministerial calculation of a 
particular number of days. Rather, such a filing potentially commences an elaborate 
multi-party proceeding. Ensuring that the triggering event for this procedure commences 
in a seasonable manner would appear to be an important administrative aspiration. 
 
Generic Responses. FDA approval of an NDA in many cases triggers a response by 
generic firms that might be interested in entering that market. Although the Hatch-
Waxman Act includes provisions that create marketing exclusivity for certain FDA-
approved drugs, these periods are relatively short in view of the time required for 
preparation and regulatory review of an ANDA or 505(b)(2) application. As a result, 
generic firms reach decisions about pursuing their own applications, along with patent 
challenges, within a relatively tight time frame. Between the duration of proprietary 
rights is obviously significant concern for these stakeholders, determining entitlement to 
patent term extension in a prompt manner serves important regulatory goals. 
 
Timeliness Within the Patent Law. Given its focus upon novelty, and its requirement of 
government intervention to secure rights, the patent law is a temporally focused 
discipline. The Patent Act includes numerous deadlines that, if not followed, lead to the 
irrevocable forfeiture of patent rights. Most significant among these is the one-year grace 
period of 35 U.S.C. 102(b). That public disclosure even one day outside that grace period 
voids all patent rights has a severe impact upon individuals unfamiliar with the patent 
system, including individuals, small firms, and academics. In contrast, applications for 
patent term extension are commonly filed by sophisticated enterprises that have just 
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achieved obtained FDA marketing approval-an occasion that is often a watershed in the 
life of their firms. 
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act further conditions a number of other benefits upon observance 
of fairly tight deadlines. For example, a brand-name firm must file a patent infringement 
suit against a paragraph IV ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicant within 45 days in order to 
obtain the right to a 30- month stay of marketing approval.23 A generic applicant must 
notify the NDA holder and patent proprietor within 20 days of filing its paragraph IV 
ANDA or 505(b)(2) application; otherwise, that application will presumably be 
considered incomplete.24 A paragraph IV ANDA applicant that files even one day after 
another may forfeit entitlement to a 180-day period of generic marketing exclusivity.25 
In the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 60-day period established by 35 U.S.C. 156 
stands as just one relatively short time frame among many. 
 
Comments on H.R. 5120 
 
In view of this statutory, regulatory, and industrial backdrop, allow me to offer some 
observations on H.R. 5120. 
 
The Extent of the Problem. Although I am unsure how many applicants the 60-day filing 
deadline for term extension has impacted, to the best of my knowledge this issue has not 
been a recurring one. I am uncertain that legislative intervention is required with respect 
to this issue. It should also be appreciated that the Hatch-Waxman Act stipulates 
numerous deadlines that impose significant obligations over even more compact time 
frames. The creation of an additional 5-day window for complying this deadline, as 
compared to many others, may strike many observers as anomalous. 
 
The Standard for Obtaining 5-Day Period. H.R. 5120 would require the USPTO to 
determine whether "the delay in filing the application was unintentional." Although I 
have no doubt that the USPTO will administer any standard that Congress stipulates at a 
high level of professional ability, the lack of an objective basis for assessing entitlements 
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to patent term extension strikes me as troubling. If the Congress means to say that 
obviously no rational actor would intentionally waive valuable periods of term extension, 
then I would encourage a simple extension of the deadline to 61, 65, or some other period 
of days that is greater than 60. Alternatively, if Congress wishes to compel a substantive 
inquiry into the fulfillment of professional obligations by the applicant or its counsel, I 
would suggest that this inquiry would undoubtedly be a thorny one. The USPTO plainly 
has more important tasks at hand, and should be allowed to pursue its core 
responsibilities without having to engage in this manner of endeavor. 
 
The Potential Advantages of Prospective Application. I am unsure how many other 
stakeholders have established a reliance interest based upon the events of any one failure 
to comply with the statutory deadline. To the extent that legislation is considered 
desirable, the common mandate that the legislation applies only on a prospective basis 
strikes me as a superior alternative. Other Section 156 Issues. Now that the subcommittee 
has extended its gaze to 35 U.S.C. 156, it should be aware that this statute has raised 
other thorny issues that may be amenable to legislative reform. Following the Federal 
Circuit opinion in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, brand-name firms 
possess a greater ability to select individual patents for term extension with respect to 
medical devices than with respect to pharmaceuticals. In addition, in Arnold Partnership 
v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit has interpreted the statute in such a way effectively to 
eliminate the possibility of patent term extension for combination therapies. Although the 
court of appeals read the precise language of 156 fairly in both cases, in my opinion this 
reading unfairly limits the availability of term extension both for pharmaceuticals in 
general, and for combination therapies in particular. The subcommittee may wish to 
address these issues as it considers reforming the Hatch-Waxman Act's term extension 
provisions. 
 
Legislative Alternatives. Finally, to the extent that H.R. 5120 is motivated by a single 
incident, a different legislative alternative might be more appropriate. Another option is 
to promote a private term extension bill in favor of the particular patent involved. Such 
legislation might more effectively convey to the public the motivation for the legislation 
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and focus attention upon relevant stakeholders in this particular circumstance. Thank you 
again for the opportunity to submit this statement. 
